Judicial Liberty on Trial: The Continued Custody in Delhi Riots Cases

News Context

1. Source and Context of the Legal Analysis

  • Legal expertise. This analysis is based on an opinion piece by Gautam Bhatia, a Delhi-based lawyer, regarding the Supreme Court’s January 5, 2026, order.
  • Article reference. The full text of this critique can be accessed via The Hindu at:
  • The “Larger Conspiracy” Case. The discussion centers on the activists arrested in 2020 following protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) and the subsequent riots in Delhi.

2. The Contradiction of Bail Orders

  • Selective liberty. While the Supreme Court granted bail to five individuals in the same case, it denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam.
  • Indefinite incarceration. By the time of the 2026 ruling, the accused had spent over five years in jail without the trial even commencing.
  • Constitutional breach. The author argues that this delay violates Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a speedy trial.

3. Critiquing the “Conceptualization” Argument

  • Differential footing. The Court justified the denial of bail by stating Khalid and Imam were “conceptualizing” or orchestrating the riots, unlike the other five accused.
  • Presumption of innocence. Bhatia points out that these are currently mere accusations, yet they are being used to justify the suspension of human rights.
  • Equal rights to speed. The author asserts that an individual’s right to a speedy trial should not diminish based on the severity of the state’s allegations.

4. The Burden of Procedural Delay

  • Blaming the accused. The Court noted that some delays were at the instance of the accused, an argument the author finds unconvincing in a courtroom governed by a judge.
  • Judicial control. It is the judge, not the accused, who has the power to refuse adjournments and ensure the trial proceeds efficiently.
  • Witness logistics. With hundreds of witnesses involved, the author highlights the high probability that the trial will not conclude for several more years.

5. Interpreting the “Terrorist Act” under UAPA

  • Broad terminology. Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) uses the vague phrase “by any other means” to define terrorist acts.
  • Chakka Jams as terrorism. The Court’s broad interpretation suggests that “chakka jams” (road blockades) could fall under the ambit of terrorism.
  • Departure from principle. This contradicts the standard criminal law principle that vague phrases should be interpreted narrowly to protect individuals from state excess.

6. The “Prima Facie” Barrier to Bail

  • Section 43(D)(5). Under UAPA, bail is denied if the court finds a “prima facie” case against the accused based on the prosecution’s records.
  • Colonial roots. The author notes that this stringent bail provision traces its origins back to laws used by the British to imprison Indian nationalists.
  • Low threshold. By widening the definition of terrorism, the court makes it much easier for the prosecution to establish a prima facie case, thus making bail nearly impossible.

7. Deference vs. Scrutiny of Evidence

  • Accepting inferences. The author argues that the Court was overly deferential to the prosecution, accepting their “managerial responsibility” theory without searching scrutiny.
  • Protest vs. Violence. The available record shows the organization of protests and blockades, which Bhatia argues do not constitute “terrorist acts” even under broad definitions.
  • Judicial remit. While the Court claimed it cannot consider “defenses” at the bail stage, the author argues it should still distinguish between evidence and prosecution inferences.

8. The History of “Conspiracy” Allegations

  • Compensating for lack of proof. Historical precedents, like the Dreyfus Affair, show that “conspiracy” charges are often used when direct evidence of a crime is missing.
  • Endless imprisonment. Allegations of conspiracy allow the state to keep individuals in jail for decades while trying to build a case that isn’t reflected in the initial record.
  • Searching scrutiny needed. The author calls for the judiciary to be more skeptical of conspiracy claims that lead to long-term incarceration without trial.

9. The “One-Year” Re-application Clause

  • Delayed justice. The Court observed that the accused could re-apply for bail on grounds of delay after another year.
  • Arbitrary timelines. This implies a judicial belief that while five-and-a-half years is not “too long,” six-and-a-half years might be.
  • Waiting for remedy. This leave-to-apply approach forces the accused to remain in custody for an additional 12 months before their liberty is reconsidered.

10. Conclusion: Liberty and Justice

  • Injustice defined. The continued imprisonment of Khalid and Imam is framed as a failure of the legal system to protect personal liberty against state overreach.
  • Future revisions. The author expresses hope that the provisional interpretations used in this bail case will be corrected during the actual trial or in future rulings.
  • Upholding Article 21. The core of the argument remains that the state has no business objecting to bail if it cannot provide a trial within a reasonable timeframe.